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want to briefly introduce Gorman’s speculative suggestion of how Aquinas 
might have thought about consistency in Christology, even if “there is no 
way to be sure” (152).
Gorman suggests that Aquinas might have distinguished two ways of 
predicating attributes to Christ: a “weak” and a “strong” one. Weak predi-
cation is an elliptic or incomplete way of talking of Christ. To illustrate: 
“From the fact that impassibility can be predicated weakly of Christ qua 
divine, it does not follow that Christ is impassible; it would follow only 
if we added the premise that Christ is only divine, i.e., that he has no 
other nature” (153). Thus, inconsistent features can be weakly predicated 
of Christ without inconsistency, not because weak predication allows 
anything to be predicated of anything, as if it were a free lunch with no 
ontological implications, but rather because weak predications are opaque 
with respect to their subject.
In the book, Gorman argues for the merits of an interpretative method 
that avoids the Scylla of “stop[ping] at the words and miss[ing] the chance 
to grasp fully the ideas behind them” and the Charybdis of “jumping too 
quickly to struggling with the Big Ideas without dealing with nitty-gritty 
of historical analysis; these miss the chance to learn something new from 
their authors” (6–7). “If we really want to engage in a historically accurate 
reading of Aquinas, we will have to be as sharp as we can speculatively” 
(6), and speculatively sharp he surely is. Even if there appear to be still 
more issues left unaddressed by Aquinas than the ones Gorman identifies, 
Gorman does an excellent job at explicating Aquinas’s texts, reconstruct-
ing his ways of thinking, and engaging the modern reader in a nimble and 
argumentative book that will remain a touchstone for years to come for 
students and researchers in medieval philosophy, philosophy of religion, 
and the history of metaphysics.
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John A. Keller’s Being, Freedom, and Method is a 401-page volume consisting 
of sixteen chapters (excluding the introduction and a lengthy concluding 
meditation) divided into five parts. The chapters include contributions 
from some of the best philosophers in the field (twenty in all) in a very well-
organized festschrift to Peter van Inwagen. The parts include Being, Free-
dom, God, Method, and Afterword. With the exception of van Inwagen’s 
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afterword, there are four to six chapters devoted to each part. Every chap-
ter engages arguments, areas, and themes to which van Inwagen has made 
major contributions in some well-known and groundbreaking articles, 
chapters, books, and reviews (183 in total) since 1972. In addition to their 
critical insights on van Inwagen’s work, the papers collected in this volume 
make substantive contributions to all of these areas. It’s an extremely well 
edited collection.
In the space provided I’ll try to give a better sense of the content of the 
chapters, or at least a better sense of the content of the parts. There’s no 
room for lengthy critical assessment—though the papers raise a number of 
fascinating and intriguing questions—I do note in passing a few questions 
and concerns. Except for noting its substance and detail, I leave Keller’s 
introduction (a fascinating one) and van Inwagen’s concluding meditation 
for the reader to review.
In “Theories of Character” Michael Loux describes the problem of 
universals and rival positions contemporary metaphysicians might take. 
There is, expectedly, no such thing as the problem of universals. There is 
instead a plurality of more or less overlapping philosophical debates (14). 
Loux argues that all of the issues are in fact issues of character.
Philosophers who claim to be responding to the problem of universals some-
times tell us that they are interested in what, following Russell, we might 
call the character of familiar particulars, that is their having the properties 
they do, their belonging to the kinds they do, and their being related to each 
other in the ways they are. This talk of character is meant to be understood 
prephilosophically; it is supposed to be theory neutral. Indeed, on this story, 
the problem of universals just is that of providing the right theoretical ac-
count of the commonsense fact that a given particular has this or that form 
of character. (12)
Among the rival views contemporary metaphysicians take on properties 
Loux distinguishes, following Wolterstorff, constituent (immanentist) on-
tologies and relational (non-immanentist) ontologies. Relational ontolo-
gies deny that particulars might have anything abstract as a part, and so 
deny that there is any part of a particular that is not a commonsense spatial 
part. The character of particulars is accounted for via their relation to these 
abstract objects. Constituent or immanentist ontologies, on the other hand, 
hold that particular objects have two mereological structures. They have 
commonsense spatial parts, and they have non-spatial parts, the latter ac-
counts for the character of particulars (e.g., their being of the kinds they 
are). Among the defenders of constituent, immanentist ontologies, we find 
David Armstrong (particulars = underlying subject + universals predicated 
of it), John Locke (particulars = underlying subject + tropes), and Bundle 
theorists (particulars = bundles of compresent universals). Among the 
well-known relational, non-immanentists, we find Plato, Chisholm, van 
Inwagen, Plantinga, and P. F. Strawson (19).
Laurie Paul defends an immanentist position that includes the view 
that there is a single fundamental ontological category in “A One Category 
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Ontology.” On Paul’s view, the world is fundamentally properties. And 
objects in the world are built in a simple way: by composition alone. There 
is no instantiation or exemplification relation, no primitive bundling com-
presence and no co-instantiation relation.
The most serious problem for Paul’s theory is the most serious problem 
for any bundle theory and that is the individuation of qualitative dupli-
cates. But what is that problem? According to the indiscernibility of iden-
ticals, objects that are qualitatively indiscernible are identical. Version (i) 
is uninteresting. Here’s version (ii) of that principle.
(ii) x and y share all of their pure intrinsic and extrinsic properties, then 
x = y.
Pure properties are what we might call non-qualitative properties: these are 
properties which, roughly speaking, ‘involve’ singular terms, being identical 
to Jones, being this cup, being Bob, being that blue shirt (49). The Supervenience 
of Identity Thesis (SIT) states that the property of being identical to x su-
pervenes on x’s pure properties. This is to say, effectively, that numerical 
identity depends on qualitative identity.
The bundle theorist can reject the supervenience thesis and reject haec-
ceities, but I’m sure she would also have to reject the principle of sufficient 
reason. Objects that are indiscernible with respect to their pure properties 
are such that, for instance, there is no explanation for their diversity, and 
that is a violation of the principle of sufficient reason. It’s just a primitive 
fact that they are diverse. But the rejection of the SIT might coincide with 
accepting haecceities. This is what substance and substratum theorists do. 
Qualitatively identical objects might differ in substrata. Isn’t that also a 
violation of the principle of sufficient reason, supposing one cares about 
that principle? These are all more or less appealing ways—less appealing, 
mostly—for bundle theorists (and austere nominalists, for that matter) to 
handle problems of identity and individuation.
In “Properties as Parts of Ordinary Objects,” Eric T. Olson provides some 
very helpful ways to distinguish constituent and relational ontologies in-
cluding six basic principles of constituent ontologies. Olson offers a very 
interesting argument that constituent ontologies lead to substance dualism. 
This, Olson believes, is bad news. According to Olson, given a constitu-
ent ontology, there will exist quasi-abstract objects, for instance, the thing 
composed of my constituent properties except my physical properties. That 
thing will be wholly immaterial. Yet all of my mental properties will be 
constituents of it. It will be psychologically indistinguishable from me. It 
will be, in short, an immaterial mind (72). It would mean that there are 
both material and immaterial human thinkers, and that for every human 
being there is one of each. The result is a bizarre amalgam of dualism and 
materialism.
On van Inwagen’s growing block model of time travel, a time traveler 
removes herself to an earlier location in the existing growing block and an-
nihilates the part of the block between her temporal point of departure and 
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her point of arrival. From the point of arrival in the past, according to van 
Inwagen, a new paradox-free block is generated (81). In “Time Travel and 
the Movable Present,” Sara Bernstein generalizes van Inwagen’s model to 
several views that include a movable objective present (MOP). The distinc-
tive feature of van Inwagen’s model of time travel is the traveler’s control 
over the location of the objective present. When the time traveler moves 
in time, she changes the location of the objective present for the entire 
manifold. Consider Bianca who travels from 2017 back to Woodstock and 
thereby annihilates the portion of the world existing from Woodstock to 
2017. There literally is no such temporal segment anymore and there does 
not exist anything that existed in that temporal segment. Bianca also an-
nihilates that portion of time during which, first time around, she did not 
attend Woodstock (82). But we might wonder how? Perhaps she goes back 
prior to the Woodstock event. If so, how does it happen that Woodstock 
occurs all over again? Maybe it wouldn’t occur, since the past is changed 
and the future is occurring over again. And what about the Bianca who did 
not attend Woodstock. Is the time traveling Bianca her 2017-stage, or is the 
new 2017 Bianca her 2017-stage? The time traveling models Bernstein dis-
cusses are interesting and ingenious and raise some fascinating questions.
Mark Heller advances a version of the luck problem for libertarians, 
in “The Disconnect Problem and the Influence Strategy” in Part II, “Free-
dom.” If an event is undetermined, then it is not determined by the agent’s 
reasons and this disconnection has the consequence that it is just luck 
when an undetermined event corresponds to the agent’s reasons (95). The 
standard libertarian response is the “influencing without determining” 
response according to which an agent can control her actions by reasons 
influencing her decisions to act. But according to Heller, if a little influenc-
ing is good, then more influencing is better, so the libertarians have no 
answer for why influencing is good and determining is bad. Heller urges 
that libertarians ought to abandon the influencing but not determining 
strategy. If the influencing strategy is the only way to respond to the luck 
problem, then we ought to abandon libertarianism.
In “Reviving the Mind Argument,” Alicia Finch revisits van Inwagen’s 
thesis about the Mind argument and the consequence argument. Van 
Inwagen argued that the Mind argument is valid if and only if the conse-
quence argument is valid. If it is held that the consequence argument is 
valid then libertarians must hold that the Mind argument has one or more 
false premises (118). It’s fairly well known that the original Beta is invalid. It 
is also widely known that several—more or less formal—revised versions 
of Beta are suitable for a revised consequence argument. Finch aims to 
show that there is another Beta-like principle—the transfer principle—that 
the anti-libertarian can use in a valid mind argument. Finch’s argument is 
frequently couched in quasi-English representations of complex, technical 
notions in free will. The formalizations are not always helpful. To offer an 
example, one premise in Finch’s argument is (23) ◻((Dw & Ptw & pw) ⟶ 
◻((Pt & Lw) ⟶ p)) is labeled “consequence of determinism.” But (23) does 
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not appear to be a necessary truth, since even if w is deterministic (“Dw” is 
necessary, if true), P is the state of the world at t in w (“Ptw,” too, is neces-
sary, if true at all), and p is true in w (“pw” again, is necessary, if true), it 
might be the case that Pt and Lw and not p. But if (23) is false, then we can-
not derive the targeted conclusion. There are similar formal worries arising 
elsewhere in the discussion. Perhaps these are all remediable, but they do 
affect the initial cogency of the anti-libertarian argument.
There is an excellent symposium on the principle of the fixity of the 
past whose contributors are John Martin Fischer, Neal Tognazzini, and 
Wesley Holliday (140). Fischer and Tognazzini consider an argument 
against the stalemate between those who defend fixity-of-the-past (FP) in-
compatibilism, and those who reject it. Wes Holliday offers an ingenious 
argument in favor of FP, and against the stalemate. Very roughly FP states 
that an agent cannot perform an action that is inconsistent with the past. 
The argument, in brief, goes this way: (i) necessarily, no one ever performs 
an action that is inconsistent with the past and (ii) if there is no possible 
world in which an action of type X is performed, then necessarily, no one 
can perform an action of type X. So, (iii) necessarily, no one can perform 
an action inconsistent with the past. (iii) just states that FP is true. It’s an 
intriguing argument as Holliday further develops it, and it doesn’t make 
any obvious mistakes. There is certainly the sense that this conclusion can-
not be correct, but locating that mistake is another matter (142).
There are six chapters included in Part III, “God,” each of which deserves 
and repays close reading. Here are a few words on some important themes 
in this section. In “Defenseless: A Critique of van Inwagen’s Response to the 
Argument from Evil,” Louise Antony argues that van Inwagen’s defense 
against the evidential argument depends on moral and modal mysteries 
(175). For instance, van Inwagen’s defense includes a discussion of the Fall 
and resulting evil, but he does not tell us why the consequences of the 
Fall were somehow unavoidable for God. In what sense were those conse-
quences necessary? Antony says that the consequences cannot be merely 
nomologically necessary, since God is not bound by physical law. Presum-
ably this means that natural laws are contingent and not that anything or 
anyone—including God—could violate an exceptionless regularity.
Both Eleonore Stump in “The Problem of Evil and Atonement” and 
Peter van Inwagen accept that something about suffering conduces to 
the ultimate good for human beings—union with God. But according to 
Stump, the doctrine of atonement and a theologically acceptable explana-
tion of suffering in the world ought to have a connected place in one grand 
unified theological theory of everything in God’s providential plan of sal-
vation (187). The thought is to say what this connected place could be. The 
aversion to suffering—which results from willing against God’s will—is 
one motivation we have for freely accepting God’s grace and the desire to 
will God’s will. The Thomistic will is thereby elicited in us—God allows 
the suffering for this reason. Contemplation of the Passion can also lessen 
resistance to God’s grace. This is one way in which the atonement and the 
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Thomistic response to suffering are connected. The role of suffering in 
salvation is explained by evoking, along with the Passion, the Thomistic 
will and greater union with God. Stump’s account is lucid and interesting.
In “Swing Vote,” Frances Howard-Snyder focuses on cases where it 
makes no difference whether or not I perform some action. It makes no 
difference whether or not I vote, drive an SUV, participate in protests, 
overfish, use public transportation and so on. And it appears to make 
no difference (to the achievement of God’s goals) whether or not God al-
lows every instance of suffering. Howard-Snyder proposes (tentatively) 
that there might be a difference in probability between the following two 
counterfactuals.
(1) If God had not prevented suffering S, then the results for achieving his 
purposes would be total success.
(2) If God had prevented suffering S, then the results for achieving his pur-
poses would be total success.
The argument is that (2) might have been slightly less probable than (1). It 
does seem to matter that (2) will not be less than (1) for every instance of 
actual evil, and, in cases where there is a difference, it does matter whether 
it is sufficiently large to make the expected value of permitting evil suffi-
ciently high. Howard-Snyder is not unaware of these issues. She opens up 
new and interesting avenues of defense against many arguments from evil.
In “Theism and Allism,” Alex Rosenberg is keen to show that Darwin-
ism is incompatible with Theism, contrary to van Inwagen’s position. The 
initial criticism of van Inwagen’s account of natural selection is the role of 
objective probability or chance in the process (230). Chance plays an im-
portant role in genetic drift, when less fit individuals survive longer and 
reproduce more. Exogenous causes such as earthquakes, forest fires, light-
ening strikes, etc. sometimes result in less fit individuals surviving longer. 
One problem for Rosenberg’s argument is that everything we observe in 
the actual world—every appearance of objective probability—is perfectly 
consistent with every event occurring as a matter of metaphysical neces-
sity. So, obviously Darwinism is consistent with everything in the actual 
world occurring as a matter of metaphysical necessity. For all we know, we 
are in a Spinozistic world. And so obviously God might have caused the 
actual world to occur in exactly the way it did, and it would appear just 
as it does appear, with every measurement being exactly what they actu-
ally are. But, setting that metaphysical worry aside, objective probability 
does seem consistent with causal determinism via an objective probability 
distribution over initial conditions (I owe this point to Tim Williamson). 
Either way we seem to have a way to make compatible Darwinism and 
Theism, but there is certainly a great deal more to discuss here.
Daniel Howard-Snyder argues against Paul Draper’s thesis that evolu-
tion provides significant evidence against (some fundamental features of) 
theism in “The Evolutionary Argument for Atheism.” The main argument 
against the Draper’s thesis aims to establish that we might have maximally 
Faith and Philosophy270
good reason to believe that, as a matter of necessity, God would not ex-
ercise his power to specially create. The numbers work out right. It is a 
problem for the probabilistic argument if Howard-Snyder can show that 
P(~S|T) = 1 (epistemic probability that God does not create specially is cer-
tain), despite granting that it is not beyond God’s power to create specially. 
But this is not easy to show. A power that is necessarily not manifested is 
a necessarily finked or masked power. Can there be such a power? Well, 
only if God has the power to do the impossible. The maximally good rea-
son we are given to believe in this maximally finked power is a Leibnizian 
one: a God that interferes with nature would be one that doesn’t plan so 
well. Probably not everyone will find that reason maximally good.
Lynne Rudder Baker argues that there is an Anselmian ontological 
argument that does not commit Anselm to a Meinongian ontology in 
“Must Anselm be Interpreted as a Meinongian” (263). She offers a non-
Meinongian Anselmian argument based on a “cognitive ability to talk 
about non-existing objects.” The argument is ingenious. Baker assumes 
that the greatest conceivable being b exists in intellectu and b does not 
exist in re. Beings existing in intellectu—including all manner of non-exis-
tent beings—fail to have causally unmediated powers and so fail to be as 
great as qualitatively indiscernible beings existing in re. It does seem to be 
an obstacle to the inference that we could also argue that b (the greatest 
conceivable being) is a round square existing in intellectu and b does not 
exist in re, and quickly prove that there is a greater round square with 
unmediated causal powers. Perhaps the objection is avoidable, but it is an 
instance of the pretty standard parodic response to Anselmian ontological 
arguments, and it looks troubling.
David Chalmers argues in “Why Isn’t there More Progress in Philoso-
phy?” that there is progress in philosophy but takes the glass-half-empty 
position—there is not as much progress as we would like. The central the-
sis is that there has not been large collective convergence to the truth on 
the big questions in philosophy (278). The big questions include things 
like: is there a god, what is the relationship between mind and body, what 
are the basic principles of morality, and so on. If we drop, consecutively, 
“large,” “collective,” “big,” and “convergence to truth” from the thesis, 
we of course get interestingly different sorts of convergence.
Why isn’t there more progress in philosophy? Why is there less conver-
gence than in the hard sciences? Chalmers offers an interesting answer: 
the hard sciences have methods that have power to compel agreement 
on the big questions in those areas. Philosophy has a method too—the 
method of argument. But the method of argument does not compel agree-
ment (286). It is in general true that one or more of the premises in virtu-
ally any interesting philosophical argument can be rejected without much 
controversy. This is not true for the axioms of mathematics or the widely 
confirmed premises in the physical sciences. But I’d urge that the problem 
is worse. It doesn’t take a longitudinal study to observe that philosophi-
cal arguments are not in general—maybe not even typically—carried out 
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in good faith. This makes the rejection of uncongenial premises a casual 
exercise, and progress very elusive.
Both “Philosophical Individualism,” by John A. Keller, and “Are 
There any Successful Philosophical Arguments?,” by Sarah McGrath and 
Thomas Kelly, are direct challenges to van Inwagen’s view of successful 
philosophical arguments. According to van Inwagen, a successful philo-
sophical argument would be convincing to an audience of ideal neutral 
agnostics about a substantive philosophical question, when ideally pre-
sented in the presence of an ideal opponent (299). Van Inwagen argues 
that there are no philosophical arguments that satisfy this public criterion. 
Keller argues against van Inwagen’s standard and in favor of a private 
criterion on the basis, in part, of his meta-criteria. The argument with van 
Inwagen is essentially moved up one level, since Keller’s meta-criteria se-
lect philosophical individualism as the standard for philosophical success. 
Keller’s brand of philosophical individualism states that an argument is 
successful for an individual just if she knows that it is sound (and non-
fallacious) (306). It does seem open whether an individual S can know p 
in cases where ideal neutral agnostics who share S’s evidence and reason 
better and more dispassionately than S do not know p.
Contrary to van Inwagen’s criterion of success, McGrath and Kelly 
offer three successful arguments for philosophical conclusions: (i) van 
Inwagen’s argument that metaphysical nihilism is false, (ii) an argument 
that inductive skepticism is false, and (iii) an argument that act conse-
quentialism is false. Each rebuts a substantive philosophical thesis, and 
each is such that many philosophers would find them compelling. Each 
of the rebuttals goes by way of counterexample (327). McGrath and Kelly 
nicely and, I think, successfully, engage the question of what constitutes 
a substantive thesis. They offer in addition a general problem for the ap-
plication of van Inwagen’s criterion. Consider any valid argument for a 
substantive philosophical conclusion p with generally known premises. 
This should count as a successful argument. But it doesn’t, since our ideal 
agnostics could not be agnostic relative to p. They would have inferred 
that p from those known premises long before we presented our argu-
ment. There are no ideal agnostics relative to p. The objection is intriguing, 
but there is a concern about whether the objection is question-begging. 
Why believe that there are such arguments as the one described prior to 
such arguments being tested in van Inwagen’s method? He might respond 
that such an argument would have to pass the test of an ideal opponent, 
who’s aim is to show that the premises are not all obviously true. If it does 
pass that test, then of course they would no longer be agnostics relative to 
that proposition.
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